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I. INTRODUCTION
Christopher, diagnosed at six years old with Asperger’s Syndrome,1 is a child
with a disability.2 Upon his diagnosis, Christopher’s public school developed his
Individualized Education Program (IEP)3 to serve Christopher’s educational needs;
however, his needs went unmet. Throughout Christopher’s four years at his public
school, his parents repeatedly met with school officials about the appropriateness of
services being offered to Christopher as his IEP did not account for the
individualized class support Christopher required.4 Despite consistent and dedicated
efforts by his parents, school officials continually informed them there was nothing
more the school or teachers could do.5 Unwilling to risk their son’s educational
future and unsure they would be able to disprove the vague “meaningful educational
benefit” substantive standard of review for an IEP, Christopher’s parents assumed

1
Asperger’s Syndrome is an autism spectrum disorder in which a person exhibits
deficiencies in social and communication skills. Online Asperger’s Syndrome Information
and Support, http://www.udel.org/bki rby/asperger/aswhatisit.html (last visited on Nov. 29,
2005). These deficiencies are generally marked by a person’s difficulty to read body language
and use language in a social context as many people with Asperger’s Syndrome are very
literal. Id. Persons with Asperger’s Syndrome also exhibit difficulties with transitions or
change. Id. In spite of these deficiencies, persons with this syndrome normally have average
IQ’s, and many possess exceptional talent or skill in a specific area. Id.
2

The following story reflects events of Christopher’s education as reported by Clara V. in
a telephone interview. The name of the interviewee has been changed to respect the privacy
of the party. Telephone Interview with Clara V., parent, in Cleveland, OH. (Oct. 2, 2005); see
also, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2006). A child with a disability means:
A child-- (i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech
or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional
disturbance (referred to in this title [20 USCS §§ 1400 et seq.] as “emotional
disturbance”), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs
special education and related services. (B) Child aged 3 through 9. The term “child
with a disability” for a child aged 3 through 9 (or any subset of that age range,
including ages 3 through 5), may, at the discretion of the State and the local
educational agency, include a child-- (i) experiencing developmental delays, as
defined by the State and as measured by appropriate diagnostic instruments and
procedures, in 1 or more of the following areas: physical development; cognitive
development; communication development; social or emotional development; or
adaptive development; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and
related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (2006).
3
An Individualized Education Program is, “a written statement for each child with a
disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 1414(d).”
MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 170 (2000).
4

Telephone Interview with Clara V., supra note 2.

5

Id.
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the costs of placing their child in a private school specializing in educating children
with disabilities.6
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or the Act) identifies
thirteen categories of disabilities that qualify children for its educational protections.7
The Act was devised to provide children with qualifying disabilities a “free
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education,
employment, and independent living.”8 Problematic, however, is IDEA’s failure to
define the term “appropriate.”9 Therefore, the United States Supreme Court in Board
of Education v. Rowley10 defined “appropriate” by stating schools have met this
substantive standard if an IEP confers “some educational benefit.”11 This definition,
“conferring an educational benefit,”12 has purposely been left very broad as the
courts have avoided establishing more stringent guidelines regarding the substantive
aspect of an IEP.13
The recent Reauthorization of the IDEA seeks to raise the bar regarding what
constitutes an “appropriate” education. The Reauthorized IDEA, which became
effective July 1, 2005 and entitled the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEIA), amended the IDEA and changed the established
substantive guideline by emphasizing and outlining new provisions that must be
present for an IEP to be deemed “appropriate” in addition to increasing training and
qualifications of special educators.14 These substantive provisions require courts to
alter their interpretations of what is considered an “appropriate” education for
students with disabilities. The IDEIA demands a more rigorous substantive
6

Id.

7

20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (2006). The thirteen categories of disabilities identified in the
IDEA are: cognitive delays, hearing impairments, speech or language impairments, serious
emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, multiple disabilities, deafness and blindness, and preschooler with a disability.
Id.
8

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006).

9

Tara L. Eyer, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic
Floor of Opportunity Community for Children With Disabilities, 103 DICK. L. REV. 613, 619
(1999).
10

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).

11

Id. at 206-07. The Court stated:
A court’s inquiry in suits brought under § 1415(e)(2) is twofold. First, has the State
complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized
educational program developed through the Act’s procedures reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the
State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can
require no more.

Id.
12

Id.

13

Id. at 207.

14

20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
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guideline for IEP measurement than the “some educational benefit” standard
developed in Rowley.15 Courts should therefore adopt the “educational opportunity”
standard proposed by the concurring and dissenting opinions in Rowley as the new
substantive standard defining “appropriate” with regards to a “free appropriate public
education.”
Part II of this paper examines the historical evolution of the IDEIA. Part III
explains the current substantive standard of “appropriate” as defined by Rowley. Part
IV discusses the concurring and dissenting opinions from Rowley and the
“educational opportunity” standard that these opinions propose to be the substantive
standard supported by the law and congressional intent. Part V analyzes the
decisions of the Third16 and Sixth17 Circuit Courts of Appeals post-Rowley and the
implications the decisions have on adopting a more viable substantive meaning for
“appropriate” within the definition of a “free appropriate public education.” Part VI
highlights the amendments to the Act in the recent Reauthorization and how these
amendments establish a need for the adoption of a higher substantive standard. Part
VII furthers the proposition that a new substantive standard should be adopted by the
courts by analyzing the congressional intent and goals for the IDEIA. Part VIII
proposes that the new substantive standard by which to measure a child’s special
education program should be the educational opportunity standard pronounced in
Rowley’s concurring and dissenting opinions. Part IX analyzes the effect of financial
considerations on the adoption of a new substantive standard and concludes that
these constraints should not hinder the progress that the IDEIA seeks to ensure for
the education of students with disabilities. Part X concludes that the definition
purported in Rowley is no longer applicable because of the amendments made in the
IDEIA and the congressional intent.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
IMPROVEMENT ACT
A. Background
In the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education, the United States
Supreme Court determined all children must be afforded an equal educational
opportunity.18 While the Court was primarily speaking to the inequality of racially
segregated public schools, the decision also impacted parents of disabled students.19
Brown provided the foundation for parents of children with disabilities to begin to
challenge school districts for the segregation of disabled children.20 These
15

See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.

16

See Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988); see
also Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of. Educ., 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004).
17

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).

18

JASPER, supra note 3, at 2.

19

Id.

20

Id. “‘[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education . . . [S]uch an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.’”
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). Id.
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challenges first arose in two federal district court cases that both ruled in favor of
providing students with disabilities access to public education.21
In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania,22 the district court enjoined state officials and school districts from
denying or postponing “any mentally retarded child access to a free public program
of education and training.”23 Mills v. Board of Education24 further held that no child
eligible for public education shall be excluded from public school placement unless
“such child is provided (a) an adequate alternative educational services suited to the
child’s needs, which may include special education or tuition grants, and (b) a
constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of the child’s status,
progress, and the adequacy of any educational alternative.”25 Even with these two
district court holdings in conjunction with the Supreme Court in Brown stipulating
that “education is a ‘right which must be made available to all on equal terms,’”
children with disabilities were continually segregated from regular education
programming for twenty-one years following the Brown decision.26
Prior to 1975, the educational needs of “millions of children with disabilities
were not being fully met.”27 Schools continued to routinely exclude children with

21

Heather J. Russell, Note, Florence County School District Four v. Carter: A Good
“IDEA;” Suggestions for Implementing the Carter Decision and Improving the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1479, 1482 (1996); Jennifer A. Knox,
Comment, The IDEIA Amendments of 1997 and the Private Schools Provision: Seeking
Improved Special Education, But Serving Only a Select Few, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 201, 203
(1999). As stated by Knox, “[t]wo federal district court cases, Pa. Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pa. and Mills v. Bd. of Educ., further paved the road for equal education for the
disabled by requiring all states to provide disabled children with a free public education.” Id.
22

Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pa., 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
23

Id. at 1258.

24

Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp 866 (D.D.C. 1972).

25

Id. at 878.

26

Rebecca Weber Goldman, Comment, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least
Restrictive Environment: Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 243 (1994).
27

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2005). In its findings regarding the enactment of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Congress found:
Before the date of enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 (Public law 94-142) [enacted Nov. 29, 1975], the educational needs of millions
of children with disabilities were not being fully met because—
(A) the children did not receive appropriate educational services;
(B) the children were excluded entirely from the public school system and from being
educated with their peers;
(C) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children from having a successful
educational experience; or
(D) a lack of adequate resources within the public school system forced families to
find services outside the public school system.
Id.
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disabilities from the educational setting,28 allowing only children with mild
impairments to participate in regular classrooms.29 Children with moderate
disabilities received little more than custodial care services at school and severely
disabled students were referred to institutions.30 In response to this monumental
disparate educational treatment that students with disabilities received in comparison
to their non-disabled peers, the federal government enacted The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act in 1975.31
B. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) sought to ensure all
handicapped children would be legally entitled to an education32 by providing
substantial federal financial assistance to all public schools that were in compliance
with its standards and were committed to educating disabled students.33 One such
standard set forth by this Act established a child’s substantive right to a “free
appropriate public education” (FAPE).34 In providing students with a disability a
FAPE, schools became responsible for locating and identifying students suspected of
possessing a disability, engaging a multi-disciplinary team to conduct evaluations,
and developing a personalized education program based on the needs of the child.35
The EAHCA also stipulated that a FAPE should be provided in the least restrictive
environment able to meet the student’s unique needs and in an environment that
includes non-disabled peers to the extent possible.36

28
JASPER, supra note 3, at 1; see also Christopher Thomas Leahy & Michael A. Mugman,
Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Due Process
Challenges, 29 VT. L. REV. 951, 952 (2005).
29
JASPER, supra note 3, at 1; see also Charlene K. Quade, A Crystal Clear Idea: The Court
Confounds the Clarity of Rowley and Contorts Congressional Intent, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POL’Y 37, 47 (2001). “In 1975, Congress noted that greater than eight million children
with disabilities lived in the United States, half of which did not receive appropriate
educational services and nearly two million of the children identified were excluded from
educational opportunities entirely.” Id.
30
Goldman, supra note 26, at 246-47; see also Quade, supra note 29, at 38. “Before the
enactment of IDEA, . . . roughly 200,000 children with disabilities were living in institutional
settings and only one in five were being educated.” Quade, supra note 29, at 38.
31

JASPER, supra note 3, at 3. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act was
enacted on November 19, 1975. Id.
32

Id.

33

Id. at 16. See also Goldman, supra note 26, at 249 (stating that the “federal government
enacted new legislation in the 1970s to increase both access to education and funding of
special programs”).
34

JASPER, supra note 3, at 16; see also Goldman, supra note 26, at 253; see also Leahy &
Mugman, supra note 28, at 952.
35

Goldman, supra note 26, at 251.

36

JASPER, supra note 3, at 16.
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C. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Even though the EAHCA proposed a dramatic educational reform through its
provision of a FAPE for students with disabilities, the Act’s programs failed in
meeting Congress’s desired educational goals.37 Students with disabilities were still
not being educated appropriately in accordance with the established standards of the
EAHCA and Congress’s ideals.38 Therefore, Congress reauthorized the EAHCA in
1990 and titled the new legislation the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA).39 Providing a FAPE, however, remained an imperative function of the
IDEA40 as emphasis continued to be placed upon this provision.41 The IDEA defined
“free appropriate public education” as:
Special education and related services that (1) have been provided at
public expenses, under public supervision and direction, and without
charge, (2) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (3) include
an appropriate preschool, elementary or secondary school education in the
State involved, and (4) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program. . . .42
The IDEA stipulated that, regardless of the severity of a disability, every child
classified as a student with a disability must receive a “free appropriate public
education.”43 Furthermore, the “free appropriate public education” required to be
provided is determined for each child based on that child’s specific needs and goals
documented in the child’s IEP.44 The IEP is the document that identifies and defines
the special educational services to be rendered to a child with a disability.45 Thus, an
IEP identifies a child’s “appropriate” education.46 It is a written statement,
developed, reviewed, and revised for each child with a disability47 that must include:

37

Knox, supra note 21, at 204. “Class size also increased, in addition to teachers’
workloads, which hindered teachers’ abilities to provide appropriate education. Moreover,
Congress found that disabled children were not being reached - few programs provided direct
services, and only small numbers of children received these services through the aid of
research and demonstration projects.” Id.
38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Goldman, supra note 26, at 243.

41

JASPER, supra note 3, at 22.

42

Eyer, supra note 9, at 616-17.

43

JASPER, supra note 3, at 22.

44

James R. Demmel, Delaware Valley School District v. Daniel G.: Did the
Commonwealth Court Create a New Standard for Determining Whether School Districts
Provide Appropriate Education for Disabled Students?, 12 WIDENER L. J. 271, 273 (2003).
45
Terry Jean Seligmann, Rowley Comes Home to Roost: Judicial Review of Autism Special
Education Disputes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 217, 223 (2005).
46

Goldman, supra note 26, at 278. “The IEP is ‘the centerpiece of [IDEA’s] education
delivery system’ because it essentially defines a particular child’s ‘appropriate’ education.”
See also Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law,
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(1) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such
child; (2) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional
objectives; (3) a statement of the specific educational services to be
provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to
participate in regular education programs; (4) a statement of the needed
transition services for students . . . [and] the projected date for initiation
and anticipated duration of such services; and (5) appropriate objective
criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at
least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being
achieved.48
In addition to these provisions, the IDEA also develops multiple procedural
safeguards to ensure its stipulations are being met.49 These safeguards allow parents
to challenge a school district in an impartial hearing before a state administrative
hearing officer when parents believe their child’s rights guaranteed under the IDEA
have been violated.50 This reauthorization essentially strengthened and expanded
upon procedures established by the EAHCA.51 Divided into four parts,52 the
legislation became “the most significant piece of legislation affecting the educational
rights of disabled children.”53
D. 1997 Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
The IDEA was amended in 1997. Even though the definition of a “free
appropriate public education” remained, the 1997 amendments to the Act attempted
to refine the substantive standard of “appropriate” by emphasizing greater
expectations for the educational achievement of students with disabilities.54 Upon

2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 572 (2003). “The IEP is the cornerstone of providing FAPE.
Courts look to whether an IEP is appropriate when assessing whether a school district has
provided FAPE.” Id.
47

20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (2006).

48

Eyer, supra note 9, at 617-18.

49

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006); see also Goldman, supra note 26, at 253.

50

Seligmann, supra note 45, at 230.

51

JASPER, supra note 3, at 16.

52

Id. at 21. The four sections are: (A) General Provisions. Definitions and Other Issues;
(B) Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities; (C) Infants and Toddlers with
Disabilities, and (D) National Activities to Improve Education of Children with Disabilities.
Id.
53

Id. at 16; see also IDEA: What’s Good for Kids? What Works for Schools Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins). “No matter what else can be said about the
program, no matter what other problems still need to be resolved, we can be proud that IDEA
has helped to ensure that the educational needs of some of our most disabled children are
being met.” Id.
54

Eyer, supra note 9, at 613, 619; see also Ingrid Carlson Barrier, Tenth Circuit Surveys:
Education, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 785, 789 (1999). “In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA
because Congress believed ‘that the critical issue now is to place greater emphasis on
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findings that the Act had not succeeded for many students with disabilities, Congress
desired to improve educational outcomes through amendments targeted at
heightening substantive requirements.55
According to Congress, improving
educational outcomes directly correlates to IEP development as the IEP is “critical to
improving compliance with the Act and to ensuring the statutory rights of the child
with disabilities.”56 The amendments strengthened evaluation procedures57 and
significantly demanded more procedures be followed in the formulation of a child’s
IEP.58 Essentially, the amendments increased procedural requirements in an effort to
confer more substantive rights and provide a better definition of “appropriate.”59
Without congressional endorsement, however, the amendments did not achieve
success in implementing a more rigorous standard for “appropriate” than that
determined in Rowley.60
III. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. ROWLEY: THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD DEFINING
“APPROPRIATE”
A. Facts and Procedural History
In Board of Education v. Rowley, the United States Supreme Court, for the first
and only time,61 established the authority defining “appropriate” with regard to a
“free appropriate public education.”62 Amy Rowley, a deaf child, successfully
completed kindergarten in a regular classroom with the assistance of an FM hearing

improving student performance and ensuring that children with disabilities receive a quality
public education.’” Id. See also Johnson, supra note 46, at 566-67, 578.
55

Quade, supra note 29, at 38-39.

56

Id. at 51.

57

Id. Students must be assessed once every three years and evaluation procedures must
include review of relevant data such as a medical diagnosis and past educational performance.
Id. The evaluation process must also review any information provided by the parent(s) of the
child. Id.
58
Eyer, supra note 9, at 632. There must now be a statement of measurable annual goals, a
statement indicating how the disability affects the child’s involvement and progress in the
general curriculum, and a statement describing the methods employed to measure the child’s
progress toward annual goals. Id.
59

Id. at 631.

60

Id. at 634 (stating that “Congress’ silence must be taken as an endorsement of the
standard’s continued validity given the key role of Rowley’s principles in development of the
IDEA over the past twenty-two years. Absent legislation imposing a new standard, there is
little support for abandoning the ‘educational benefit’ test”).
61
Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 863 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that
“Rowley is the only Supreme Court decision to have addressed the level of educational benefit
that must be provided pursuant to an IEP”).
62
Steven N. Robinson, Note, Rowley: The Court’s First Interpretation of the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 941, 943 (1983). The
Supreme Court interpreted the EAHCA for the first time in Rowley. Id.
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aid63 and school personnel learning sign-language interpretation.64 Amy’s IEP,
developed when she entered first grade, provided for Amy to be educated in a regular
classroom with use of her FM hearing aid.65 The IEP also stipulated Amy would
receive supplemental services from a tutor and speech therapist.66 Desiring a signlanguage interpreter instead of the offered assistance, the Rowleys disagreed with the
school’s proposal.67 They asserted their procedural rights under the Act68 and filed
for a hearing before an impartial officer, claiming Amy’s IEP did not afford her a
“free appropriate public education” as guaranteed by the EAHCA.69
Upon a review of the evidence, the impartial officer quashed the Rowley’s
challenge explaining Amy’s academic and social success in kindergarten established
that an interpreter was an unnecessary accommodation.70 After an affirmation by the
New York Commission of Education, the Rowleys appealed to the District Court for
the Southern District of New York.71 The district court, finding a discrepancy
between Amy’s potential and her actual achievement, reversed the ruling of the two
lower authorities, determining Amy did not receive a “free appropriate public
education.”72 After the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district
court’s decision, the school district then petitioned for review by the Supreme
Court.73 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the interpretation of “free
appropriate public education” made by the lower courts.74

63

An FM hearing aid is a listening system which picks up a speaker’s voice through use of
a microphone and then transmits it as a radio signal directly to the person wearing a hearing
aid. American Hearing Aid Associates, http://www.ahaanet.com/glossary.asp#F (last visited
Nov. 28, 2005).
64

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 184 (1982).

65

Id.

66

Id. (stating that “Amy should be educated in a regular classroom . . . , should continue to
use the FM hearing aid, and should receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one hour
each day and from a speech therapist for three hours each week”).
67

Id.

68

20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006).

69

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.

70

Id. (explaining that “[a]fter receiving evidence from both sides, the examiner agreed
with the administrators’ determination that an interpreter was not necessary because ‘Amy was
achieving educationally, academically, and socially’ without such assistance”).
71

Id.

72

Id. at 185-86 (“This disparity between Amy’s education and her potential led the court to
decide that she was not receiving a ‘free appropriate education,’ which the court defined as ‘an
opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to
other children.’”).
73

Id. at 186.

74

Id.
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B. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
In its decision, the Court examined both the statutory language and
congressional intent of the Act to determine the definition of “appropriate.”75
Echoing the language from Mills, the Court stated that deciding whether the offered
special education programming is appropriate hinges on two questions.76 First, it
must be decided whether the State complied with the procedures stipulated in the
Act.77 Second, it must be decided whether the “individualized educational program
developed through the Act’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the child
to receive educational benefits.”78 The second question pertains to the substantive
standard of what constitutes the meaning of “appropriate.” According to the
statutory definition, the Court reasoned that if supportive services combined with
individualized instruction allow a child to gain an educational benefit, an
“appropriate” education is being offered.79 Furthermore, such services and
instruction must be provided at public expense, approximate grade levels used in
regular education programs, meet state educational standards, and align with the
child’s IEP.80
Congressional intent further confirms this determination as “some standard for
FAPE was ‘implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a free
appropriate public education.’”81 However, Congress sought to merely ensure that
public education was accessible to handicapped children, not require that such
education would be anything greater than meaningful.82 Therefore, the Court
overturned the district Court’s ruling that an “appropriate” education needs to

75

Id. at 190. The Court stated, “[a]lthough we find the statutory definition of ‘free
appropriate public education’ to be helpful in our interpretation of the Act, there remains the
question of whether the legislative history indicates a congressional intent that such education
meet some additional substantive standard.” Id.
76

Id. at 206-07.

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 189.

80
RONALD D. WENKART, APPROPRIATE EDUCATION FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES:
HOW COURTS DETERMINE COMPLIANCE WITH THE IDEA 5 (2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203-04 (1982)). See also Johnson, supra note 46, at 564.
81
82

Johnson, supra note 46, at 564.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192 (“By passing the Act, Congress sought primarily to make public
education available to handicapped children. But in seeking to provide such access to public
education, Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational
standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful.”).
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maximize a child’s potential.83 Instead, the Court held an education need only confer
“some educational benefit” to meet the substantive standard of the Act.84
Applying this rationale, the Act does not promise academic success but does
promise “some educational benefit.”85 The standard of a “free appropriate public
education” is designed to implement only a basic floor of opportunity.86 While it
ensures that the door to a public education will be open, it does not guarantee a
specified substantive educational level.87 To meet the substantive standard of the
Act, a student’s IEP must provide only an appropriate education, not necessarily the
best education.88 Consequently, an appropriate education must produce only some
progress in both academic and non-academic settings.89
IV. THE “EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY” STANDARD
Justices Blackmun and White, however, disagreed with the majority’s standard
in their respective concurrence and dissent.90 Instead, the Justices proposed a
different standard by which to measure whether a child’s IEP is “appropriate.”91
“Appropriate,” they decided, should equate to affording a child with disabilities an
equal educational opportunity.92

83

Id. at 200 (“The District Court and the Court of Appeals thus erred when they held that
the Act requires New York to maximize the potential of each handicapped child
commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children.”).
84

Id. The Court ruled, “[i]mplicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a
‘free appropriate public education’ is the requirement that the education to which access is
provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.” Id.
85

Seligmann, supra note 45, at 228.

86

Demmel, supra note 44, at 276.

87

Eyer, supra note 9, at 621 (“Thus, the intent of the Act was more to open the door of
public education to [children with disabilities] on appropriate terms than to guarantee any
particular level of education once inside.” (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
192 (1982))).
88
Sharon C. Streett, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 35, 45 (1996); see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 195 (stating that the “Act imposes no clear
obligation upon recipient States beyond the requirement that all handicapped children receive
some form of specialized education is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that Congress, in
explaining the need for the Act, equated an ‘appropriate education’ to the receipt of some
specialized educational services”).
89

Streett, supra note 88, at 46.

90

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 210, 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (White, J., dissenting).

91

Id.

92

Id. at 214 (White, J., dissenting).
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A. Justice Blackmun’s Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun pronounced that Congress clearly
intended to guarantee students with disabilities an equal educational opportunity.93
Otherwise, the legislation would only represent “politically self-serving but
essentially meaningless language about what the [handicapped] deserve at the hands
of the state . . . authorities.”94 Declining to follow the majority’s standard,
questioning whether Amy Rowley’s education was “reasonably calculated to enable
[her] to receive educational benefits,”95 Justice Blackmun believed an educational
program, viewed as a whole, must be analyzed according to whether it gives a
student with disabilities an opportunity to learn and participate in the classroom that
is substantially equal to the opportunity afforded to nonhandicapped peers.96 This,
according to Justice Blackmun, should be the standard by which to measure whether
an education is deemed “appropriate” according to the Act.97
B. Justice White’s Dissent
This standard was further emphasized by Justice White in his dissent. Agreeing
that the language on the face of the statute does not imply a substantive standard for
educational programming beyond “appropriate,” Justice White relied on the purpose
and legislative history of the Act in determining the equal educational opportunity
standard was more viable than the majority’s “some educational benefit”
proclamation.98 Both explicit language within the Act99 and congressional intent
support this definition.100 Therefore, “appropriate” means affording “handicapped
children an educational opportunity commensurate with that given other children,”101
not the “some educational benefit” standard adopted by the majority.

93

Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring). “Congress unambiguously stated that it intended
to ‘take a more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to guarantee
that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity.’” Id.
94
Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 32 (1981) (Backmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
95

Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

96

Id.

97

Id. at 210-11.

98
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 213 (White, J., dissenting). “I agree that the language of the Act
does not contain a substantive standard beyond requiring that the education offered must be
‘appropriate.’ However, if there are limits not evident from the face of the statute on what
may be considered an ‘appropriate education,’ they must be found in the purpose of the statute
or its legislative history.” Id.
99

Id. (“The Act itself announces it will provide a ‘full educational opportunity to all
handicapped children.’”).
100
Id. at 214. “The legislative history thus directly supports the conclusion that the Act
intends to give handicapped children an educational opportunity commensurate with that
given other children.” Id.
101

Id.
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Even though Justices Blackmun and White did not reach the same conclusion
regarding whether Amy Rowley’s education was appropriate, they did agree on the
standard by which to measure whether an education was “appropriate.”102 Both
Justices believed students with disabilities must receive an education that provides
opportunities to learn similar to those given non-disabled students. It is not enough
that students receive “some educational benefit,” as the basic floor of opportunity is
“intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child
will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible.”103 To give
students with disabilities an “equal opportunity to learn,” IEP’s must be measured
against the “educational opportunity” standard as the “some educational benefit”
standard is not viable.
V. POST-ROWLEY DECISIONS
A. Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16
Although bound by Rowley’s holding, decisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals
have elaborated on the “some educational benefit” standard, perhaps indicating a
preference for a higher substantive standard like that suggested by Justices White
and Blackmun in their respective opinions in Rowley. 104 The Third Circuit, in Polk
v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, entertained a challenge of an IEP’s
appropriateness. 105 Christopher Polk, a severely disabled student, required physical
therapy as part of the related services provided by his IEP.106 His school sought to
meet this need by providing Christopher’s teacher training in physical therapy.107
The Polks argued that this did not provide their son with a “free appropriate
education” as Christopher’s individual needs required he receive therapy directly
from a licensed physical therapist.108 In its decision, the court identified that
“meaningful” in “meaningful educational benefit” must demand a level of education
that is more than de minimis or trivial.109 The court rationalized this interpretation
through its analysis of congressional intent.110 This holding slightly expanded the
“some educational benefit” standard, possibly impressing a preference for a higher
substantive standard like that suggested by Justices White and Blackmun.

102

Id. at 211, 214 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (White, J., dissenting).

103

Id. at 215.

104

Polk v. Cent. Susquchanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 1988).
“Therefore we must examine the Act’s notion of ‘benefit’ and apply a standard that is faithful
to Congressional intent and consistent with Rowley.” Id.
105

Id. at 171.

106

Id. at 173-74.

107

Id. at 174.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 180.

110

Id. at 182 (“Instead, we infer that the emphasis on self-sufficiency indicates in some
respect the quantum benefits the legislators anticipated: they must have envisioned that
significant learning would transpire in the special education classroom. . . .”).
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B. Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education
Continuing to further the substantive requirement of Rowley, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Deal v. Hamilton County Board of Education, combined the
Rowley standard with the de minimis requirement from Polk.111 Zachary Deal, a
child diagnosed with autism, began receiving services from his public school district
at the age of three, as per his IEP.112 In conjunction with his school-provided
services, the Deals also provided Zachary with private teaching that followed
methods of applied behavior analysis (ABA) therapy.113 For the following two
school years, the IEP team developed plans that utilized a variety of teaching
methods.114 However, the district continually refused to pay for Zachary’s private
ABA therapy, neglected to provide extended school year services for the summer of
1999, and only provided for limited engagement in a regular classroom.115 The
Deals, desiring that Zachary spend more time in a regular classroom and that the
district pay for his ABA therapy, subsequently rejected the district’s proposed IEP
for the 1999-2000 school year and placed Zachary in a private preschool program.116
The district responded the following year by developing an IEP that primarily placed
Zachary in a regular kindergarten classroom with various supportive services.117
Rejecting the proposed IEP once again, the Deals contended the district should pay
for Zachary’s ABA therapy program and requested an administrative hearing
alleging violations of IDEA against the district.118
Among its findings, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the
district substantively violated the IDEA.119 On appeal, the district court reversed the
ruling of the ALJ, stating the district did not substantively or procedurally violate the
IDEA.120 The Deals appealed to the Sixth Circuit.121 Within its analysis of the
substantive standard required by IDEA, the court noted deference to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley, but expanded the standard as much as

111

Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 861 (6th Cir. 2004). The court
followed the Rowley standard stating that the level of education required to be provided to a
child with a disability must only be calculated to provide the child with more than a de
minimis educational benefit. Id.
112

Id. at 845.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 846-47.

115

Id. at 846.

116

Id. at 846-47.

117

Id. at 847.

118

Id.

119

Id. The ALJ found that “[t]he School System had substantively violated the IDEA by
failing to provide a proven or even describable methodology for educating autistic children.”
Id.
120

Id. at 849.

121

Id.
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possible within its authority.122 Similar to the Third Circuit in Polk, the court first
stated the educational benefit must be more than de minimis.123 Continuing in its
substantive analysis, the court profoundly stated this level of substantive review is
capable of becoming insufficient as “there is a point at which the difference in
outcomes between two methods can be so great that provision of the lesser program
could amount to denial of a FAPE.”124 Therefore, the court agreed with other circuit
court decisions, that “the IDEA requires an IEP to confer a ‘meaningful educational
benefit’ gauged in relation to the potential of the child at issue.”125 Supporting this
expansion to the Rowley standard, the court stated:
[n]othing in Rowley precludes the setting of a higher standard than the
provision of ‘some’ or ‘any’ educational benefit; indeed, the legislative
history cited in Rowley provides strong support for a higher standard in a
case such as this, where the difference in level of education provided can
mean the difference between self-sufficiency and a life of dependence.126
Analyzing the Rowley decision and recent legislative history surrounding the
1997 amendments to the IDEA, the Sixth Circuit concluded that providing only some
educational benefit would never permit children with disabilities to attain the goals
Congress foresaw when creating the legislation.127 Following this interpretation and
in furtherance of the substantive standard imposed by the IDEA, the Sixth Circuit
reversed and remanded the decision of the district court, requiring the district court
to analyze whether the education offered to Zachary Deal would provide a
meaningful educational benefit in consideration of his individual abilities.128
Deal presented a forceful step among case law authority in defining what is
considered appropriate, as it furthered the decision of the Third Circuit in Polk.129
These decisions represent a movement toward a heightened substantive standard, as
lower courts now analyze an appropriate education to be one that provides “some
meaningful educational benefit.”130 In citing a standard that is more than “some
educational benefit,” these recent decisions promulgate a standard more aligned with

122
Id. at 854-55. “The Supreme Court has spoken on the level of education that the states
are required to provide to disabled children. . . . The court explicitly rejected the argument that
school districts are required to provide services ‘sufficient to maximize each child’s potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.’” Id.
123

Deal, 392 F.3d at 861.

124

Id. at 862.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 863.

127

Id. at 864. “Indeed, states providing no more than some educational benefit could not
possibly hope to attain the lofty goals proclaimed by Congress.” Id. (emphasis in original).
128

Id. at 867.

129

Telephone Interview with Nessa G. Siegel, Esq., Partner, Nessa G. Siegel Co., L.P.A.,
in Cleveland, Ohio (Jan. 16, 2006).
130

Telephone Interview with Kerry M. Agins, Esq., Partner, Nessa G. Siegel Co., L.P.A.,
in Cleveland, Ohio (Jan. 16, 2006).
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the educational opportunity standard opined by Justices Blackmun and White. The
educational opportunity standard requires a level of educational benefit that is more
than de minimis, one that is meaningful and one that ensures each child is offered a
full educational opportunity. The Reauthorization of the IDEA seeks to continue the
insight of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, as its new regulations also promote the
adoption of the educational opportunity standard.
VI. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT: A CALL
TO INCREASE THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD DEFINING “APPROPRIATE”
The IDEA became the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
of 2004 (IDEIA) upon its Reauthorization, effective July 1, 2005.131 Amending
provisions regarding IEP development and teaching qualifications for children with
special needs, the IDEIA seeks to further the goals of the 1997 IDEA amendments
by establishing a higher substantive meaning for an appropriate education than that
applied in Rowley.132 Once again, the federal government, now through the IDEIA,
seeks to implement a better education for children with disabilities, as Congress
found that the implementation of the IDEA “has been impeded by low expectations,
and an insufficient focus on applying replicable research on proven methods of
teaching and learning for children with disabilities.”133 This directly reflects the need
for courts to adopt a new substantive standard for “appropriate,” other than merely
conferring “some educational benefit.”
A. IEP Amendments
Analyzing the amendments, it first must be noted that the government removed
mandating the inclusion of short-term objectives and benchmarks in IEPs for all
students with disabilities.134 These objectives and benchmarks are now only required
to be included in IEPs for students placed on alternative assessments.135 The new
131
20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006); Cory L. Shindel, One Standard Fits All? Defining
Achievement Standards for Students with Cognitive Disabilities Within the No Child Left
Behind Act’s Standardized Framework, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 1025, 1039-40 (2004).
“Reauthorization of a statute is required when Congress approves sections of a law for a fixed
period of time. At the termination of the fixed period, Congress must affirmatively re-approve
the select provisions, of the IDEA that are permanently authorized, the reauthorization process
gives Congress an opportunity to reconsider and revise the IDEA generally.” Id.
132

20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2006); see Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).

133

20 U.S.C. § 1400(4) (2006).

134

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006); see also CHARLES J. RUSSO ET AL., INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT VS. IDEA ’97: CHARTING THE CHANGES 221-22
(2005). The 1997 IDEA stated an IEP must include:
[A] statement of measurable annual goals, including benchmarks or short-term
objectives, related to – (1) meeting the child’s needs that result from the child’s
disability to enable the child to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum;
and (2) meeting each of the child’s other educational needs that result from the child’s
disability.
Id.
135

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II). Students who have IEPs and are unable to participate
in State or local standardized testing due to their disability are issued alternate assessments to
replace taking a standardized test. Alternate Assessments are a “collection of evidence that
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language reads that an IEP must include “a statement of the child’s present levels of
academic performance, including – (cc) for children with disabilities who take
alternative assessments aligned to alternate achievement standards, a description of
benchmarks or short-term objectives.”136 This omission in the IDEIA facially
appears to reduce the substantive standard of “appropriate” within the meaning of a
FAPE.137 However, this concern of the recent exclusion of short-term objectives and
benchmarks is erroneous.
In light of the IDEIA becoming law, neither attorneys representing school
districts nor those working as child advocates, have witnessed the language omitting
benchmarks to affect or minimize provisions of FAPE.138 Admittedly, this
elimination might hinder a school district’s ability to measure progress and
objectively determine the appropriateness of an IEP as only overarching goals will
need to be stipulated in an IEP.139 However, in practice, while the omission of the
language is a loss for the child, schools are still including short-term objectives and
benchmarks for most students as it safeguards the school districts from entertaining
challenges regarding their provision of FAPE.140 School districts will also likely be
advised by their attorneys to decide whether to include these statements on a caseby-case basis looking at the needs of the individual child.141 Furthermore, this
omission is not likely to hinder the level of what constitutes an appropriate
education, as school districts will now have to craft more measurable goals to ensure
that a FAPE is still being provided.142 If there can no longer be reliance on shortterm objectives and benchmarks to provide measurable standards, school districts
must ensure written goals are precise and accurately convey that an appropriate
education is being offered.143 Additionally, some state laws still require short-term

shows student performance of standards-based knowledge and skills within the context of
classroom instruction.”
Ohio Department of Education, http://www.ode.state.oh.us/
proficiency/Alternate_Assessment/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
136

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(cc).

137

Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning of Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA, Getting
Behind No Child Left Behind and Getting Outside of it All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 3
(2004); see also Shindel, supra note 131, at 1077-78.
138
Telephone Interview with Agins, Esq., supra note 130; Telephone Interview with
Siegel, Esq., supra note 129; Telephone Interview with Christina Peer, Esq., Squire, Sanders
& Dempsey, in Cleveland, Ohio (Jan. 17, 2006).
139

Telephone Interview with Agins, Esq., supra note 130.

140

Telephone Interview with Siegel, Esq., supra note 129.

141

Telephone Interview with Peer, Esq., supra note 138. Even if a student is not on an
alternative assessment, it might be advisable to still include short-term objectives and
benchmarks. Whether or not to include short-term objectives and benchmarks must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
142

Id.

143

Id.
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objectives and benchmarks to be included in every IEP.144 This negates the
elimination of this IEP feature even though the IDEIA does not require it.
The objective of this omission within the IDEIA is to reduce the paperwork
burden placed on special education teachers, not to reduce the meaning of what
constitutes an “appropriate” education.145 The legislators hoped that a reduction in
required paperwork would enable educators to focus on quality education and allot
more time for direct instruction.146 Therefore, combined with the remaining
amendments to IEP development and the requirement that teachers become highly
qualified, the retraction of mandating that each IEP contain short-term objectives and
benchmarks is likely minimal and does not outweigh the remaining provisions that
support the incorporation of a higher substantive level for an education to be deemed
“appropriate” than that purported by the Court in Rowley.
The “some educational benefit” standard is no longer viable, as the IDEIA
implements new provisions that highlight a desire to increase the standard of what
constitutes an “appropriate” education. Because a free appropriate public education
is measured through a child’s IEP, many aspects of the IDEIA sought to address and
establish more stringent provisions in IEPs that emphasize substantive education as
opposed to mere procedural guidelines.
First, the statement of a student’s present levels in the IEP must now include
academic and functional performance.147 Emphasizing that both academic and
functional performance levels be included clarifies the vague “educational
performance” term used in the 1997 amendments.148 This added terminology reflects
the Senate’s desire that children with disabilities be afforded the same opportunities
as individuals without disabilities to live independent and productive lives, as
functional performance speaks to incorporating life skill goals.149 Ensuring that
students with disabilities are afforded not only educational opportunities, but also
opportunities to live independently and self-sufficiently, imposes a greater

144
Id. Ohio still mandates that short term objectives and benchmarks be incorporated in an
IEP. Id.
145
Hearings, supra note 53, at 64 (statement of Robert Runkel, Administrator of the
Division of Special Education, State of Montana).
Our current preoccupation in special education on process has contributed to the
paperwork burden that you hear so much about. . . . Most parents I know are more
concerned about the benefit their child is receiving from the program than they are
about the number of parental rights brochures they have received . . . some parents
fear that a paperwork reduction could mean the loss of certain procedural rights now
afforded under the protections of the IDEA. It is our job to maintain the protections of
the IDEA while solving our dilemma with paperwork.
Id. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1408(a) (2006).
146

RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 32.

147

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2006). “The term ‘individualized education program’
or ‘IEP’ means a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed,
and revised in accordance with this section and that includes . . . a statement of the child’s
present levels of academic and functional performance. . . .” Id.
148

RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 221.

149

Hearings, supra note 53, at 1 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
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substantive quality to education than just “some educational benefit.” The IDEIA
speaks to ensuring lifelong benefits, not just some meaningful education. The
incorporation of functional performance in the IDEIA language purports to further
the need to incorporate a substantive standard that expands and departs from the
views of Rowley.150
Additionally, an IEP must now describe how a child’s progress toward meeting
annual goals will be measured and when periodic reports will be provided.151 This
increases accountability standards important to Congress in meeting the goals of the
IDEIA.152 It also ensures authorities can no longer claim that a child is progressing
when IEP goals and objectives remain identical over consecutive years.153
Accountability that primarily focuses on procedural compliance regarding special
education and related services is no longer viable, as it neglects to hold authorities
accountable for the substantive aspect of a special education program.154 Requiring
documented statements regarding how a child’s progress will be measured and when
reports will be provided aids in ensuring students make “strides towards challenging
and appropriate learning and developmental goals.”155 This language advocates
documenting clear progression, which seeks definitive progress, not just minimal
growth.
Furthermore, special education and related services provided to students with
disabilities must now be based upon peer-reviewed research when available.156 This
requires school and state officials to consider the best practices and methods that
peer-reviewed journals and conferences endorse.157 School officials will no longer
be able to justify services on what they deem acceptable. This addition to IEP
development is in direct contrast to Rowley’s determination that the standard for
education of students with disabilities is to merely implement only a basic floor of
150

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).

151

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(III) (2006).

152

Hearings, supra note 53, at 17 (statement of Sen. Jack Reed) (“Accountability and
monitoring of programs must be improved.”).
153
Id. at 21 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary for Special Education
and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education).
154

PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW ERA: REVITALIZING
SPECIAL EDUC. FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 36 (2002) [hereinafter COMMISSION]. “In
testimony and public comment the Commission heard repeatedly about the need to focus
special education accountability on the results achieved by students with disabilities.
Witnesses from a variety of perspectives told us the current approach to accountability in
special education is too focused on procedural compliance.” Id.
155

Id.

156

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (2006).
The term ‘individualized education program’ or ‘IEP’ means a written statement for
each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance
with this section and that includes - . . . (IV) a statement of the special education and
related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research
to the extent practicable. . . .

Id.
157

RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 223.
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opportunity.158 Requiring schools to base services upon peer-reviewed research
requires educators to do more than just open the door to public education for students
with disabilities. Instead, the IDEIA requires authorities to research and consider
best practices, not simply those that are adequate or will only produce some progress.
Finally, regarding IEP development, the IDEIA is dedicated to improving
transition services within a child’s IEP.159 Transition services are a coordinated set
of activities for a child with disabilities that are focused on improving a child’s
movement from school to post-school activities.160 Once again, functional and
academic performance is clearly emphasized, as the definition of transition services
was refined to not only state that the activities promote movement from school to
post-school activities, but also that transition activities are “focused on improving the
academic and functional achievement of the child with a disability to facilitate the
child’s movement from school to post-school activities.”161 Additionally, the
definition in the 1997 amendments stated transition service activities must be
“designed within an outcome-oriented process,”162 while the IDEIA states these
activities must be “designed within a results-oriented process.”163 The key is no
longer to only reach an outcome, but to achieve specific results within attaining the
prescribed outcome.
Prior to the IDEIA, transition services were often not implemented to the fullest
extent, resulting in non-beneficial outcomes.164 The language regarding these
services in the IDEA was also confusing, leading to the provision of ineffective
services.165 Accordingly, under the IDEIA, an IEP must now include “appropriate
measurable postsecondary goals based upon age appropriate transition
assessments.”166 Transition services must be addressed in a child’s IEP no later than

158

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982).

159

Hearings, supra note 53, at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy); see also
COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 47. “The Commission finds that IDEA must be changed to
clearly link students’ long-range transition goals to the development of the annual IEP goals,
objectives and activities.” Id.
160

20 U.S.C. § 1401(34) (2006).

161

20 U.S.C. § 1401(34)(A) (emphasis added).

162

RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 21.

163

20 U.S.C. § 1401(34)(A).

164

COMMISION, supra note 154, at 46. “The Commission found that transition services are
not being implemented to the fullest extent possible and that meaningful results do not
happen.”
165

Id.
School personnel must be provided clear and concise rules and regulations outlining
how to provide effective and relevant transition services to students with disabilities
seeking to enter the workforce immediately following high school as well as for
students planning to attend college. The IDEA’s current requirements are too complex
and do not adequately meet this need.

Id.
166

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(cc) (2006).

160
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when the child reaches the age of sixteen167 and they must serve to assist a child in
reaching enumerated postsecondary goals.168 Emphasizing transition services
exhibits a heightened standard of “appropriate,” as the IDEIA is concerned with
increasing a child with disabilities’ progression through life.169 Congress’s goal is
not for education to provide only “some educational benefit,” but to encourage
independence and allow students with disabilities to become “self-sufficient
members of their communities.”170 Therefore transition services, through the IDEIA,
now emphasize results, not just a scripted outcome.171 It is not sufficient for students
with disabilities to just reach the outcome of transitioning into society. Students
must be provided the tools and knowledge to live independently; hence, the results of
transition services are to be emphasized.172 Accordingly, efforts to increase
transition services directly supports strengthening the meaning of “appropriate” as
Congress is concerned with a child’s progress through life’s stages, not merely grade
to grade progress.173
B. Highly Qualified Teachers
The IDEIA also seeks to ensure that special educators are highly qualified and
can provide the level of education necessary for students with disabilities.174 Under
the IDEIA, special education teachers must now meet the provisions of “highly
qualified” status to be employed to teach special education.175 This requirement
parallels the mandate of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and
aligns with the No Child Left Behind Act, which requires all teachers to meet highly
qualified standards in addition to obtaining an educational license.176 To be deemed
highly qualified, a teacher, according to the No Child Left Behind Act, must possess
full certification, a bachelor’s degree and prove competence in subject knowledge
and teaching.177 The IDEIA expands upon this definition and details specific
provisions for special educators which include that:

167

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII).

168

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII).

169

Hearings, supra note 53, at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). “Most
important, we need to explore new ways to aid children with disabilities as they progress
through life’s many transitions from early childhood to elementary school, from elementary
school to high school, from high school to college, and on to a good job.” Id.
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Hearings, supra note 53, at 5 (statement of Sen. James M. Jeffords).
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See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(34) (2006).
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See COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 47-48.

173

Hearings, supra note 53, at 2 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
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Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins).
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20 U.S.C. § 1401(10) (2006).
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RUSSO ET AL., supra note 134, at 7.

177

United States Department of Education, http://www.ed.gov/nclb/methods/teachers/
teachers-faq.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
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(i) the teacher has obtained full State certification as a special
education teacher (including certification obtained through alternative
routes to certification), or passed the State special education teacher
licensing examination, and holds a license to teach in the State as a special
education teacher . . . (ii) the teacher has not had a special education
certification or licensure requirements waived on an emergency,
temporary, or provisional basis; and (iii) the teacher holds at least a
bachelor’s degree. . . .178
Requiring personnel to be highly qualified reflects statements made by the
Commission on Excellence in Special Education which recommended that to
improve special education services:
States and districts must devise new strategies to recruit more personnel
who are highly qualified to educate students with disabilities. State
licenses and endorsements for all teachers should require specific training
related to meeting the needs of students with disabilities and integrating
parents into special education services. States must develop collaborative,
career-long professional developmental systems that conform to
professional standards.179
While recommending recruitment of teachers and stipulating that special
education teachers be highly qualified, committees proposing amendments for the
IDEIA also recognized the current shortage of special education teachers.180 Since
1988, the field of special education has been plagued by shortages and the IDEA has
not increased teacher retention, as the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA neglected to
address this problematic issue.181 In developing the IDEIA, however, teacher
shortages were addressed and solutions to this problem were recommended.182 Such
solutions included higher wages, differential pay scales, and improving working
conditions.183 Because of Congress’s realization and commitment to retain special
educators, it is unlikely that requiring personnel to be highly qualified will further
deter individuals from entering the field of education. Instead, educators will now
desire to provide an appropriate education to students with disabilities and be
qualified to do so.
The purpose of implementing requirements for schools to employ highly
qualified teachers is to ensure special education reaches higher levels and meets
178

20 U.S.C. § 1401(10)(B).

179

COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 51.

180

Id. at 52-54.

181

Id. at 52, 54. “The growing shortage of special education teachers alarms this
Commission. Ninety-eight percent of school districts report special education teacher
shortages. Roughly 10 percent of special education positions nationally – 39,140 positions –
are filled by uncertified personnel who serve approximately 600,000 students with
disabilities.” Id. at 52.
182

Id. at 55. The Commission suggested States and districts devise new approaches to
retain special educators who are highly qualified. Id.
183

Id.
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more rigorous demands.184 Untrained educators hinder movements to increase the
achievement of students with disabilities.185 “Consistently, the single biggest factor
affecting academic progress of populations of children is the effectiveness of the
individual classroom teacher – period. The sequence of teachers that a child has will
add more to their own personal academic achievement than probably any other
single factor.”186 Stipulating that teachers must be highly qualified will, therefore,
provide a greater educational benefit to students with disabilities.187 Providing a
greater educational benefit once again speaks to the IDEIA’s promulgation that a
higher substantive standard be associated with the meaning of “appropriate.”
The crux of the IDEIA is to promulgate higher standards for the education of
students with disabilities. Each of the amendments regarding IEP development and
the stipulation that teachers must now obtain highly qualified status support this
contention and promote the purpose stated in the IDEIA to “assess, and ensure the
effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with disabilities.”188
VII. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION
IMPROVEMENT ACT
Congressional intent, in addition to the language of the IDEIA, also impresses a
need for a more rigorous substantive standard in educating students with disabilities.
The amendments to the IDEIA focus attention on substantive components, thus
analyzing and improving the meaning of “appropriate” in “free appropriate public
education.” Furthermore, Congress’ intent is clearly to strengthen legislation and
provide “the right services to the right children at the right time, in the right settings,
and with the right personnel to achieve the right results.”189 Findings by Congress
stipulating the need for the IDEIA noted that increasing results for students with
disabilities “is an essential element of our national policy.”190 As noted in the first
hearings discussing the Reauthorization, “[w]hile progress has been made, the true
184

Hearings, supra note 53, at 16 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary
for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education). “[I]f we
do not have highly-qualified teachers instructing students, we are never going to get the kinds
of results that parents have a right to expect and Congress has the right to demand.” Id. See
also COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 52.
185

COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 51.

186

Id. at 52.

187

Hearings, supra note 53, at 4 (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins) (“Providing more
quality special education teachers will bring us a great deal further toward providing quality
education to students with disabilities.”).
188

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(4) (2006).

189

Hearings, supra note 53, at 11 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary
for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education).
190

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1). “Improving educational results for children with disabilities is
an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with
disabilities.” Id. See also H. R. REP. NO. 108-813, pt. 2 (2005). “The report emphasized the
need to move the IDEA away from compliance with cumbersome and bureaucratic rules and
restore the focus to educational results for students.” Id.
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promise of [the] IDEA – a free appropriate public education for all children with
disabilities – has not yet been realized.”191 Eighty percent of states failed to comply
with the requirements concerning a “free appropriate public education”192 and
compliance has been focused on process, not results.193 While compliance with
process has produced gains for the education of students with disabilities, it is now
time to introduce a culture focused on accountability and emphasizing results.194
Furthermore, students with special needs remain “those most at risk of being left
behind” creating “an urgency for reform that few can deny.”195 Congress, therefore,
in reauthorizing the IDEA, sought to refocus the states and emphasize substantive,
not procedural, aspects of the law.196 The IDEIA should be flexible in order to
achieve desired outcomes for students with disabilities.197 Additionally, the IDEIA
should include “a unified system of services from birth through 21, and simplify the
. . . IEP to focus on substantive outcomes.”198
Congress’ emphasis on substantive results and its realization that states
continuously fail to meet the full expectations of the IDEA’s premise and vision,
unequivocally demands that courts reanalyze the current substantive standard. If
increasing results for students with disabilities is truly a primary national policy, the
“some educational benefit” standard must be discarded. This standard does not
effectuate Congress’s goal to ensure substantive results, as it only ensures an
education will be more than trivial. Students’ individual needs and unique
capabilities leading to future success will not always be accounted for in a disabled
student’s educational programming if only “some benefit” need be shown for schools
to be in compliance with the IDEIA. This level of education does not pass muster
under the standards Congress sought with the issuance of the IDEIA. Accordingly,
the “some educational benefit” standard set forth by Rowley is no longer appropriate
in evaluating the education of students with disabilities.
191

Hearings, supra note 53, at 6 (statement of Sen. Jack Reed).

192

Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Jack Reed).

193

Id. at 14 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary for Special Education
and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education). “Under current law, compliance
does not focus on improved results for children. Instead, compliance has been too focused on
process as opposed to results.” Id. See also COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 7. “[T]he current
system often places process above results, and bureaucratic compliance above student
achievement, excellence and outcomes.” Id.
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Rosenbaum, supra note 137, at 5. “Paige unveiled a set of principles which stated that
the ‘IDEA must move from a culture of compliance with process to a culture of accountability
for results.’” Id.
195
COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 4. “Although it is true that special education has
created a base of civil rights and legal protections, children with disabilities remain those most
at risk of being left behind. The facts create an urgency for reform that few can deny.” Id.
196

Hearings, supra note 53, at 14 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary
for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education) (“We want
the States to focus on results and compliance with the key substantive requirements of the
law.”).
197

COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 11.
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Id.
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VIII. THE ADOPTION OF A NEW SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD
The purpose of the IDEIA is to “ensure that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them
for further education, employment, and independent living.”199 Fulfilling this ideal is
essential to the success of the legislation and the education of students with
disabilities. Minimal efforts by educators will not lead to this desired result;
however, this is all the Rowley standard requires by stipulating students will receive
“some educational benefit.”
Lower courts have realized this problem and have responded by interpreting
Rowley to require that education must provide a meaningful benefit.200 This
expansion, while making apparent the desire that a more substantive education be
offered to students with disabilities, cannot be fully realized under the current
Rowley precedent.
Therefore, a new substantive standard for determining
“appropriate” within a free appropriate public education must be adopted. Based
upon the language of the IDEIA and the goals Congress sought to achieve through
the legislation, the “educational opportunity” standard suggested by Justices
Blackmun and White in Rowley should be the new standard in determining whether
an offered education is “appropriate” within the meaning of the IDEIA.201
The “educational opportunity” standard stipulates students with disabilities must
be provided an education substantially similar to that afforded to their non-disabled
peers.202 This is not to suggest that a child’s education must be maximized,203 only
that children with disabilities be afforded the same opportunities to learn as nondisabled students receive.204 Educational curriculum for students without disabilities
is focused on providing knowledge and tools to assist with post-secondary education,
future employment, and preparing them to live independently. This is the exact
focus special education programming must have as purported by the purpose of the
IDEIA.205
Providing an equal educational opportunity not only reflects explicit language in
the IDEIA,206 but the heightened procedures incorporated through the amendments
199

20 U.S.C. §1400(d)(1)(A) (2006).

200

See Polk v. Cent. SuSusquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988);
see also Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2004).
201

Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 211, 214 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(White, J., dissenting).
202

Id. at 213-14 (White, J. dissenting).

203

Id. at 212-13 (White, J., dissenting) (“Certainly the language of the statute contains no
requirement like the one imposed by the lower courts – that states maximize the potential of
handicapped children ‘commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children.’”).
204

Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Rather, the question is whether Amy’s program,
viewed as a whole, offered her an opportunity to understand and participate in the classroom
that was substantially equal to that given her nonhandicapped classmates.”).
205
206

See 20 U.S.C. §1400(d)(1)(A) (2006).

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006) (providing that a state must establish a goal of providing a
full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities).
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and congressional intent also advocate implementing the “educational opportunity”
standard as the new measurement of “appropriate.”207 The IDEIA itself serves to
provide students with disabilities every opportunity afforded to non-disabled
Americans.208 As noted in the House Report detailing the activities of the Committee
on Education and the Workforce, “[n]ow more than ever, we must see that children
with disabilities are given access to an education that maximizes their unique
abilities and provides them with the tools for later success.”209 This thought is
heralded in the numerous amendments written in the IDEIA. Each new IEP
provision speaks to enhancing a child’s education by providing for life-long benefits,
accounting for functional performance and concentrating on results, not just a
minimum outcome.210 Additionally, requiring that special educators become highly
qualified ensures students with disabilities will receive the same level of education as
non-disabled students, as teachers will now be appropriately trained. Each
amendment represents the sentiments expressed in the “educational opportunity”
standard, as they serve to detail an education extremely similar to that offered to
regular education students. Focusing on a curriculum that will ensure future success
promotes societal goals to educate students for independent and functional lives.
Accordingly, to meet society’s expectations of developing productive individuals,
education of students with disabilities must do more than provide some benefit. It
must provide these students the same opportunities to learn and succeed as their nondisabled peers. Therefore, the “educational opportunity” standard, which requires
courts to determine whether a disabled child’s IEP provides “an educational
opportunity commensurate with that given other children,”211 should be the standard
adopted by the courts.212
If the goal is to give all handicapped students the same opportunities as nonhandicapped students to learn, function, progress, and live independently, a standard
for “appropriate” must mean more than merely conferring “some educational
benefit.” The standard does not hold officials accountable to the purpose and high
standards set forth by the IDEIA, and does not purport to ensure a level of education
equal to that given to non-disabled peers. The focus for the education of students
with disabilities has shifted to emphasize the importance of the outcomes of the
provided education, not merely procedural compliance with the law.213 The
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Hearings, supra note 53, at 12 (statement of Robert H. Pasternack, Assistant Secretary
for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education).
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Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
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H.R. REP. NO. 108-813, pt.2, at 140 (2005).
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See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq. (2006).
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Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 214 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 214 n.2 (“In any case, the very language that the majority quotes from Mills, . . .
sets a standard not of some education, but of educational opportunity equal to that of
nonhandicapped children.”).
213

Hearings, supra note 53, at 64 (statement of Robert Runkel, Administrator of the
Division of Special Education, State of Montana).
I cannot emphasize enough how important it is to focus on outcomes for students with
disabilities. A local education agency can be in total compliance with every
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“educational opportunity” standard, promulgated through the IDEIA, fulfills both
congressional and societal expectations of equality in educational opportunities for
the disabled and the non-disabled, and therefore should be the accepted standard in
this country.
IX. FINANCIAL CONCERNS
Intrinsic with the adoption of a new substantive standard for what constitutes an
“appropriate” education is the implication that this result will surely impose greater
financial costs. With the heightening of any standard, it must be expected that costs
will increase to some degree.214 Since the enactment of the IDEA, Congress has
been aware of the financial burdens that the federal law requires.215 However,
Congress’s ability to rationalize such expenditures revolves around the theory that
mandating greater educational attention for students with disabilities will result in
limiting future monetary spending, as these students will be better able to be selfsufficient members of society.216
A. Past Financial Difficulties
Upon the original enactment of the IDEA, the federal government promised to
assume forty percent of the costs associated with implementing the provisions set
forth in the law.217 States would then be responsible for the remainder of the
balance.218 Unfortunately, there has been a historical under-funding of special
education at the federal level.219 Federal government reimbursement never reached
levels of supplying forty percent of special education funding. In fact, the federal
government reimbursement decreased to comprise only seven percent of special
education expenditures.220 While this results in billions of public dollars spent
annually, the educational level envisioned by the IDEA is applied inconsistently and
unevenly among states and school districts.221
B. Resolutions to Solve Financial Difficulties
These facts are disheartening for special education funding. However, while it
may seem unlikely that a heightened substantive standard could be monetarily
supported, this consideration was taken into account upon the drafting of the IDEIA.
The Commission on Excellence, in its proposals for the IDEIA, specifically targeted
procedural step and still not guarantee positive educational outcomes for its students.
That is why it is so important to continue to strengthen our focus on outcomes.
Id.
214

Eyer, supra note 9, at 636.
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Russell, supra note 21, at 1514.

216
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Goldman, supra note 26, at 283.
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financing problems and ways to resolve concerns to ensure states and districts are
provided adequate means to provide the desired educational results.222 The
Commission proposed to revise calculations of excess costs and to maximize the use
of federal funds.223 The goal is to allow states greater flexibility in their spending
and to balance the shared responsibility for financing special education.224 The
Commission further proposed to increase funding to states who have submitted state
improvement plans consistent with No Child Left Behind for implementing new
accountability systems that will better measure results for students with
disabilities.225 The IDEIA echoed the sentiments and goals of the Commission.226
Now included in the law is the federal government’s original promise of providing
for forty percent of special education funding.227 The government has set the goal to
achieve this level of support by the year 2011.228
While financial constraints do play a significant role in being able to adopt a
more sufficient substantive standard, they should not halt the progress towards
amending the “some educational benefit” standard. The federal government is not
ignoring the fact that special education requires funding and has addressed these
concerns in the IDEIA. Additionally, opinion polls calculated during the enactment
and passage of the IDEIA proved Americans were more concerned with emphasizing
“high standards and accountability for results” to improve public schools than
increasing government spending.229 Any time improvement is sought, costs must be
incurred. However, providing the proper education for students with disabilities that
the law and Congress seek to ensure must take precedent.
X. CONCLUSION
The amendments made in the IDEIA exhibit intent to implement a
heightened substantive meaning of the word “appropriate.” Evident in the
amendments is a desire to provide a quality education to students with disabilities.
Therefore, the “some educational benefit” standard devised in Rowley should be
abandoned, as it does not coincide with the recent standards set forth by the IDEIA.
Applying the “educational opportunity” standard, however, aligns with the purpose
of the IDEIA. This standard increases substantive provisions, as it ensures students
with disabilities are afforded an opportunity commensurate with that given to other
children. Therefore, the “educational opportunity” standard, directly echoing
222

COMMISSION, supra note 154, at 29.
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Id.

224

Id. at 33. “We must allow states greater flexibility to financially manage their shortterm and long-term financial responsibility. Federal policy with respect to IDEA funding must
give states more discretionary ability to direct funds that best serve children with disabilities in
their state rather than a prescribed set of requirements that do not take unique local conditions
and needs into account.” Id.
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congressional intent and explicit language in the IDEIA, should be the determinate
against which an “appropriate” education is measured.
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